Most of the wars in the modern history had not ended with a complete victory of one side but through bargaining and peace negotiation. However, Pakistan has adopted the classic model of negotiated war termination, while the modern war termination trends are already moving away from the ‘classic model of negotiated war termination. In a classic war termination model a cease-fire or armistice is arranged before both parties begin negotiations.
Thus the nominees of both the parties deal with a static military situation. Once combat stops and then both parties start bargaining. In such situations Governments usually further use the military to improve negotiated terms. It is very important as any negotiation planning by a Government must consider how the opponent can be brought to the bargaining table? And, once negotiations start, how can military force be used to bring them to a rapid and favourable close? Taliban and their international operators appears to be more cleverer in their strategic approach to the whole process.
Taliban has announced the so called ‘cease-fire’ but the terrorist attacks are still continuing in the country to make Taliban’s bargaining position even stronger. Military operation is almost on halt by the Government. The Taliban can use this military operational pause provided by the cease-fire to strengthen its defensive position, reconstitute its forces, and redeploy.
It is astonishing that some of the Pakistani Politicians have demanded that military should not be a part of the negotiating process. There is no doubt that opening of a peace process is always a major shift in the State of the war. But we must not forget that military cannot be isolated from the process as in such situations military achieves the political objective determined by the politicians.
The military objective changes from action to achieve the political objective through military victory to actions that exert influence on the negotiated settlement. As political analyst,William O. Staudenmaier has rightly noted in his book “Conflict Termination in the Nuclear Era:
‘If the goal of the decision maker is to resolve the political issues for which war was begun, then the emphasis of military strategy should shift from its narrow preoccupation of destroying enemy forces to a consideration of how military means may be used to resolve political issues’.
Pakistani government should have the technical capacity to coordinate military and civil negotiating strategies. Governments across the globe now are presented with a dynamic military situations and a powerful and flexible military tool for influencing negotiations.
Fen Osler Hampson theChancellor’s Professor at Carleton University in Ottawa, Canadaobserves a causal relationship of the following independent variables to the success and failure of peace negotiation and settlements: first, ripeness of conflict; second, role of a third party facilitator; third, the quality of a peace agreement; and fourth, the role played by a great power.
The conflict is fully ripened for Government of Pakistan as according to the statistics of South Asian Terrorism portal from 2003 to April 2014 Pakistan have lost 18775 Civilians and 5681 security forces personals in terrorist violence. It has also resulted in todestruction of infrastructure, internal migration of millions of people from parts of north western Pakistan, erosions of investment climate, nose diving of production and growing unemployment and above all brought economic activity to a virtual standstill in many part of the country. Pakistan had never witnessed such devastating social and economic upheaval in its industry, even after dismemberment of the country by direct war.What does the Taliban have to lose? Nothing. While at first glance the calling of a ceasefire may seem like the Taliban was put on the back foot by the government’s aggressive response, the developments actually reveal that the Taliban continue to retain the upper hand in the dynamic.
The “role of a third party facilitator” is equally important as it serves as a crucial catalyst in developing supportive relationships between adversaries that may lead to de-escalation of conflict. It helps both sides realise their ownership of the problem that should be solved collaboratively and no longer as a ‘contest to be won’. But neither the Government nor the Taliban nominated committees could be regarded as neutral or suited for taking on a mediating role.
As far as the Quality of agreement is concerned, we must not forget that in 2008 Swat agreement was aimed at ending violence but saw an increase instead as the Taliban took control of the Swat valley. The 2004 deal with militant leader Naik Mohammad resulting in the Shakai agreement was followed by an almost immediate withdrawal on his commitments. The agreement bolstered his legitimacy amongst the tribals and turned him into a veritable war lord. The 2005 Sararogha agreement with Baitullah Mehsud exacerbated the confrontations it aimed to reduce. It helped install Mehsud as the chief of the Pakistani Taliban. The biggest dilemma of the future agreement is that Pakistani Government has not yet outlined any objectives or clear agenda for these peace negotiations. The Taliban however have more clarity in their objectives asthey wants Sharia to be imposed in the country. For the Taliban, this would mean accepting the illegitimacy of its self-declared state of the Islamic Emirate of tribal areas, where the writ of the Pakistani government has given way to so-called Islamic laws, similar to Afghanistan in the 1990s.
Lastly, the “role of a great power” is crucial to the compliance of the adversaries because of the incentives it can provide, the strong influence it has over the adversaries and its capability to pressure client states and parties in the conflict. Although America and her Middle Eastern allies appears to be very happy and satisfied with the initiation of negotiations but the fact remains that the peace deals on Pakistani soil have potential repercussions for the militant activity in Afghanistan.
This is because the peace deals can be instrumental in re-orienting the attention ofthe Pakistani Taliban towards Afghanistan. In periods of ceasefire the Pakistani Taliban can be expected to concentrate on the purpose of fighting the invading forces in the neighbouring countries. Hence the peace deals in Pakistan concern the reconciliation process related to the Afghan Taliban.It is highly unlikely that US will play any favourable role in this peace process. Hence There is little prospect of a negotiated settlement.
